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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael South appeals contending the district court erred in overruling his objection to
the prosecutor’s misconduct in rebuttal closing argument. The State’s response is flawed for two
reasons. First, its argument on the merits is based on a flawed understanding of the applicable
case law. Second, the State failed to argue a full half of the applicable standard for harmless
error, and so, failed to carry its burden in that regard. For both these reasons, this Court should
reject the State’s arguments and remand this case for a new trial in light of the objected-to
misconduct in the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. South’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by overruling Mr. South’s objection to the prosecutor’s
erroneous argument in his rebuttal closing arguments.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Overruling Mr. South’s Objection To The Prosecutor’s Erroneous
Argument In His Rebuttal Closing Arguments

A.

The State’s Argument On The Merits Is Based On A Flawed Understanding Of The
Applicable Case Law
Mr. South’s argument on the merits is straightforward – by arguing he “likes to play with

knives” and “likes to break into people’s homes,” the prosecutor was making an improper
argument about his alleged criminal propensity based on facts that were not in the record. (App.
Br., pp.9-14.) The State, relying on dicta from Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47
(1974),1 essentially contends this Court should attempt to find a less-damaging interpretation of
the prosecutor’s comments. (Resp. Br., pp.5-8.) The State’s argument is not proper, because
Donnelly’s dicta only applies to closing arguments which are ambiguous, and the prosecutor’s
improper arguments in this case were not ambiguous.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted in similar contexts, an assertion is only
“ambiguous” if it is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. See, e.g., Regan v. Owen, 163
Idaho 359, 365 (2018) (applying this principle to questions of whether a statute is ambiguous);
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 527 (2008) (applying this principle to questions of
whether a contract is ambiguous). As the Idaho Supreme Court has also pointed out, the mere

1

Discussions of legal points which are not necessary to resolution of the issue on appeal are
considered dictum and are not controlling precedent. State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74 (2013).
The Donnelly Court concluded that, even considering the improper interpretation of the
prosecutor’s “admittedly ambiguous” argument at closing, it did not violate the defendant’s due
process rights primarily because it was “followed by specific disapproving instructions” from the
trial judge. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. As such, the subsequent portion where it opined about
how courts should go about evaluating the reasonableness of competing interpretations of
ambiguous arguments was not necessary to resolution of the case, and therefore, was dicta. See,
e.g., State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1154 (Az. 2004) (recognizing the portion of the Donnelly
opinion on which the State relies in Mr. South’s case to be dicta), en banc.
3

fact that a party can construct an alternative interpretation does not automatically make that
alternative interpretation reasonable, so as to render the statement ambiguous. E.g., Swanson v.
Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63 (2007) (“A party’s subjective, undisclosed interpretation
of a word or phrase cannot make the contract ambiguous. If it could, then all contracts would be
rendered ambiguous merely by a party asserting a misunderstanding of the meaning of one or
more of the words used.”); Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston Sch. Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11,
14 (2004) (“Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented
to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Courts which have addressed Donnelly’s dicta in the context of closing argument have
used those principles as well, explaining that, when the alternative explanation of the closing
argument requires a “considerable inferential leap,” it is not reasonable. E.g., Woodward v.
United States, 56 A.3d 125, 128-29 (D.C. App. 2012); Moody, 94 P.3d at 1154-55. In those
cases, the prosecutor’s argument is not ambiguous, and as such, Donnelly’s dicta is not
applicable; rather, those unambiguous arguments are simply misconduct. Id.; see also Donnelly,
416 U.S. at 645 (implying this same analysis: “a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor
intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through
lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.”)
(emphasis added).
Here, as in Woodward and Moody, the prosecutor’s statements were not ambiguous. It
takes no great inference of logic to understand the assertions that “he likes to play with knives”
and “he likes to break into people’s homes” as referring to Mr. South’s character and to his
propensity to conduct himself in that manner in this case. In fact, the record in this case reflects
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the potential facts to which the prosecutor’s statements in those regard referred, as the prosecutor
initially wanted to be allowed to present evidence of other cases in which Mr. South was alleged
to have engaged in that sort of similar conduct, particularly with respect to his use of the knife.
(See R., pp.86-88, 95-96; Tr., p.10, Ls.14-15; see also Tr., p.111, Ls.9-23 (the prosecutor
ultimately withdrawing that request after the district court provided case law showing it was
inadmissible).) It does, however, take a considerable inferential leap to consider those broad
statements about his character as being a “sarcastic” comment limited only to the facts of this
case, as the State now tries to contend. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) As such, the State’s interpretation
of those arguments was not reasonable. That means Donnelly’s dicta is not applicable here – the
unambiguous arguments were simply improper.
And even if the State’s alternative explanation were reasonable, that would not
automatically show there was no reversible misconduct. While the prosecutor may not have
intended to commit misconduct in such a situation, that does not make the argument itself
proper. See, e.g., State v. Kirk, 157 Idaho 809, 812 (Ct. App. 2014). In Kirk, the prosecutor
recited a verse from the song “Dixie” in closing argument of a trial of an African American
defendant. Id. at 811. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that song carries a particular racial
animus. Id. at 812. Thus, even though the Court specifically noted the prosecutor did not appear
to intend to inject race into the trial by making a particular closing argument, the Court held the
argument itself was still problematic because the argument itself could reasonably be interpreted
in that way: “a prosecutor’s mental state, however innocent, does not determine the message
received by the jurors or their individual responses to it.” Id. The United States Supreme Court
reached essentially the same conclusion in a similar situation: “even if a jury could have ignored
[the erroneous interpretation], we cannot be certain that this is what they did do.” Sandstrom v.
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Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979) (evaluating the effect of a potentially ambiguous jury
instruction) (emphasis from original). As such, even if there might have been a reasonable
alternative interpretation of the prosecutor’s argument in Mr. South’s case, that does not mean
the argument itself was not erroneous. Cf. State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000) (“In cases
where it is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect
legal theory, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.”).
Since there was a reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor’s argument – indeed, the
most, if not the only, reasonable interpretation of that argument – which was an improper
reference to facts not in evidence and which invited the jurors to convict Mr. South on a
propensity basis, the prosecutor’s closing argument (intentional or not) constituted misconduct
and should result in a new trial.

B.

The State’s Argument For Harmless Error Fails To Address A Full Half Of The
Applicable Standard
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently made clear: “Harmless error is ‘error unimportant

in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the
record.’” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020) (quoting Yates v.
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled on other grounds). Importantly, the Supreme Court
pointed out: “Proper application of the Yates two-part test requires weighing the probative force
of the record as a whole while excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing
it against the probative force of the error.” Id. (emphasis added). As a result, it is only “[w]hen
the effect of the error is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ without the error, [that] it can be said that the error did not
contribute to the verdict rendered and is therefore harmless.” Id. (emphasis added). As such, the

6

State must address not only the other evidence in the record, but also the probative force of the
error itself, when it invokes the harmless error doctrine. Id.; accord State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 598-99 (2013) (holding the State failed to carry its burden under the harmless error standard
when it failed to actually argue the proper standard for harmless error).
The reason the State cannot rely just on the amount of other evidence in the record
without addressing the probative force of the error itself is that doing so is to “commit the same
mistake the United States Supreme Court overturned in Chapman v. California, [386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967)]” because such an argument merely asserts that the other evidence in the record was
overwhelming. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1139. “[W]e reiterate that the proper showing for ‘harmless
error’ is not ‘overwhelming evidence’ of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 1138. Or, as the Supreme
Court put it in Almaraz:
[T]he State never specifically argues that [the erroneously-admitted evidence] did
not ‘contribute to the verdict obtained’ as clearly required under [State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209 (2010)]. For example, the subject is not even discussed in the
State’s written brief on appeal . . . . As such, the State has failed to meet its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict in this case would
have been the same even if [the erroneously-admitted evidence] had not been
admitted.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598-99.
And yet, despite that clear Idaho Supreme Court precedent directly on point, the State
proceeded to make the improper overwhelming-evidence argument in Mr. South’s case: “the
evidence that South threatened Laura with a knife, hit her in the mouth and injured her, and
damaged a closet and bedroom door in Oliver’s house is overwhelming.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) The
State did not evaluate the probative force of the error itself at any point in its argument. (See
generally Resp. Br., pp.9-12.) As such, the State did exactly the same thing which the United
States Supreme Court held to be error in Chapman. See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1139. Simply put,
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the State’s argument ignores an indispensable half of the applicable test, and so, should be
rejected. Id.; Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598-99.
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief, there were bases for reasonable doubt in the State’s
evidence. (See App. Br., pp.12-14.) For example, the credibility of the State’s witnesses was in
question. There was, for instance, several bases on which to question whether Mr. Oliver was
biased against Mr. South and exaggerating his testimony to try to make sure Mr. South got
convicted. In addition to his baseless assertion that Mr. South had Neo-Nazi tattoos (Tr., p.179,
Ls.19-20), there is also evidence indicating Mr. Oliver might have altered the condition in which
officers found the knife. Mr. Hersey was clear that, when he and Mr. Oliver initially found the
knife under the car several days after Mr. South was arrested, the knife was not in a sheath.
(Tr., p.270, Ls.3-9.) However, when the officer came to collect the knife several hours later, she
was clear that the knife was in a sheath. (Tr., p.406, Ls.4-14.) As such, the jurors could have
harbored a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Oliver put the knife in the sheath during the
intervening period to more directly implicate Mr. South.2
There was also a basis upon which to question whether Ms. Goodell was exaggerating
her testimony against Mr. South to distract from, or gain leniency with respect to, her own
criminal behavior. That is implied by the fact that Mr. Oliver initially testified Ms. Goodell was
evasive in identifying herself to officers and looked as if she was trying to sneak away before
they arrived. (Tr., p.242, L.22 - p.243, L.18.)
Since Mr. Oliver and Ms. Goodell were the central witnesses to the State’s case, their
credibility was a central question for the jurors in this case. Compare State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
2

The jurors might have been particularly inclined to consider the evidence in this way if they
harbored any reasonable doubt about whether the explanation for Mr. South’s actions proffered
by defense counsel – that Mr. South caught Mr. Oliver and Ms. Goodell in a compromising
situation (Tr., p.166, L.24 - p.167, L.5) – was accurate.
8

11-12 (2013) (finding error not harmless when there was a basis for reasonable doubt of the
victim’s account of events). However, the prosecutor’s misconduct in this case invited the jurors
to overlook the reasonable doubts they may have had about their credibility and convict
Mr. South based on a propensity basis – that he likes to play with knives and break into people’s
houses and must have acted in accordance with that character (as the two witnesses asserted) in
this case. As such, the impact of the error itself was not minimal in the overall context of this
case, and thus, that error not harmless under the Garcia/Yates standard.
The State also contends that the fact Mr. Oliver baselessly claimed Mr. South had “NeoNazi bolt tattoos” on his neck was irrelevant in this regard (Resp. Br., pp.10-11), but that
argument also ignores the proper standard. Just because the district court agreed that such
testimony was error and took steps to make that particular error, by itself, harmless, that does not
mean the cumulative impact of that error alongside the prosecutor’s improper rebuttal closing
arguments is unimportant. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007) (explaining that,
even though errors might be independently harmless, their joint effect can still be prejudicial);
cf. Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 116 Idaho 794, 803 (1989) (recognizing that, when
jurors hear improper information, even if a corrected version of that information is subsequently
presented, “the jurors can hardly be expected to unring the bell” and not consider the improper
version of the information).
The State also contends that the district court’s instruction to only consider the evidence
was sufficient to nullify the impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct in this regard.

(Resp.

Br., pp.9-10.) The Court of Appeals has already rejected that argument. State v. Martinez, 136
Idaho 521, 526 (Ct. App. 2001). The Martinez Court explained that generic instruction identified
by the State is not sufficient to “eradicate” the potential that the information impacted the jurors’
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deliberations, especially if the misconduct is of a particularly prejudicial nature. Id. As the Sixth
Circuit put it when it also rejected the argument the State is now making, “this generic
instruction cannot overcome the weight of the prosecutor’s comments. . . . The completely
generic instruction here, given before the start of trail, does not approach the sufficiency” of
other, repeated limiting instructions which mitigated the impact of the misconduct because they
were specific to the misconduct at issue. Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 735 (6th Cir. 2020)
(distinguishing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986), and Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 644,
and noting that Donnelly also acknowledged that specific limiting instructions would not always
be sufficient to render such misconduct harmless)). The same is true in Mr. South’s case,
especially when the combined effect of the misconduct and the tattoo comment is taken into
effect.
In fact, since the generic instruction to consider only the evidence elicited is given in
virtually every criminal case, the State’s argument is effectively asking this Court to declare that
no prosecutorial misconduct is ever reversible error. That, of course, does exactly what the
Idaho Supreme Court has held improper – make such mistakes acceptable practice. See State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 984 n.1 (1992) (such “[m]istakes must not become the practice”);
accord Darden, 477 U.S. at 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Guzman – which the State does not so much as cite (see generally Resp. Br.) –
directly contradicts one of the State’s other arguments. Specifically, the State argued that this
Court should not consider any pattern of misconduct in determining whether the argument in this
case was misconduct because “[Mr.] South cited to no Court that has held that such a sanction is
appropriate” in light of a pattern of such misconduct. (Resp. Br., p.11 (emphasis from original).)
However, the majority of the Court actually did reach that holding in Guzman, as quoted on page
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13 of the Appellant’s Brief: “A court on observing that a pattern of mistakes has developed, on
seeing yet another ‘mistake,’ might readily decide to view such circumstance with a jaundiced
eye, and rule accordingly.” Guzman, 122 Idaho at 984 n.1 (emphasis added). As such, this
Court should reject the State’s blatantly-false argument in this regard.
That is particularly true since there is actually a troubling pattern becoming apparent in
this regard which this Court should, as Guzman held, take into consideration. In his concurrence
in Phillips, Judge Schwartzman identified seven cases in which the appellate courts had actually
found that some form of misconduct from this same prosecutor’s office had occurred. State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 89 (Ct. App. 2007) (Schwartzman, J., specially concurring). Mr. South
identified seven more opinions decided since Phillips which had also found some form of
misconduct had occurred from this same prosecutor’s office. (App. Br., p.14.) Whether or not
the misconduct in those fourteen cases was ultimately reversible error is irrelevant; the critical
point is that the courts concluded misconduct had occurred. Fourteen appellate opinions finding
prosecutorial misconduct over the course of twenty-three years, equating to approximately one
and one-half such appellate opinions per year, certainly looks like the sort of pattern which both
Judge Schwartzman and United States Supreme Court Justice Blackmun specifically warned
about. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 89 (Schwartzman, J., specially concurring); Darden, 477 U.S.
at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As such, this Court, on seeing yet another such “mistake,”
should view that circumstance with a jaundiced eye, and rule accordingly. See Guzman, 122
Idaho at 984 n.1.
Since the State failed to argue under the proper standard, much less prove this
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the proper standard,
this Court should vacate the conviction obtained based, in part, on that misconduct.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. South respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for
a new trial.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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